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NEWS & PUBLICATIONS

Professor Joan M. Heminway joins College of Law faculty
By Scott Dill
In the fall of 2000, Professor Joan M. Heminway
joined the faculty of the College of Law. Professor
Heminway blends a combination of her work experience and views on the study of law to create an effective and pleasant learning environment for her students.
Professor Heminway began her legal education with
uncertainties similar to those of many current students.
She was born in Mineola, New York, and attended Brown
University as an undergraduate. She graduated from
Brown with magna cum laude distinction in International
Relations and History. Many of her friends and family
urged her to obtain a law degree. Like many students,
she decided to follow that advice and attend law school
to “receive a broad-based, post-undergraduate training.”
Professor Heminway started at New York University
School of Law without a clear vision of the type of law
she wanted to practice. However, during her first year
of law school, she began work as a corporate legal assistant for a firm in New York City. She was exposed to
corporate law while preparing closing rooms and editing

Faculty Notes
Professor Amy Morris Hess was
named a University Distinguished
Service Professor of Law in the
spring of 2000. In the summer of
2000, Professor Hess published a
replacement volume dealing with
the new prudent investor statutes
in BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND
TRUSTEES, a multi-volume treatise.
She has been the successor author
of the Bogert treatise since 1994,
and has published pocket parts for all of the volumes
every year. Several other replacement volumes are also
in progress.
Professor Joan Heminway recently served as Program
Chair for the inaugural Bench Meets Bar Program sponsored by the Business Law Section of the Boston Bar

Professor Joan Heminway brings 15 years of practical experience with the Skadden, Arps firm to the
UT College of Law faculty.
corporate documents. She stated, “I developed a focus
early on in law school. At the end of the first year, I
knew I liked corporate law.” During the summer after
her second year in law school, Professor Heminway
worked for Willkie, Farr & Gallagher, LLP, a New York
continued on page 4

Association. The program, Corporate Law 2000: Views from the Delaware Chancery Court, focused on
comparative corporate law principles and their impact on firm
value, featuring both a key note
address by Vice Chancellor
Stephen P. Lamb of the Delaware
Chancery Court and a panel discussion led by Professor
Heminway.
Professor Thomas E. Plank’s article The Bankruptcy Trust as a Legal
Person was published at 35 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 251 (2000). His article The Creditor in Possession Under
the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and
Policy, was published at 59 MD. L.
REV. 253 (2000). On July 31, 2000,
Professor Plank gave a presentacontinued on page 5
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Heminway joins faculty
starts on page 3

law firm that specializes in corporate transactional and
litigation work. Although she was unsure exactly what
type of corporate work she wanted to pursue, Professor
Heminway knew she had found her focus.
Professor Heminway graduated from law school and
obtained invaluable experience that makes her a valuable asset to the College of Law. In 1985, she was

‘As a goal-oriented person, I asked
myself what else there was to the practice
of law besides the thrill of the next deal.’
admitted to the Massachusetts bar and began work as an
associate for Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom,
LLP in Boston. During her fifteen years with Skadden
Arps, she specialized in securities law and mergers and
acquisitions. For example, she represented America
Online, Inc. in its acquisition of Netscape Corporation.
Professor Heminway also represented NaviSite, Inc., an
internet application service provider, in the initial public
offering of its common stock. In addition, she represented Softkey International, Inc. in its acquisition of
The Learning Company and numerous smaller corporations.
During her private practice, Professor Heminway provided humanitarian legal services to her surrounding
community. For example, she was an Advisory Board
Member to a community legal services and counseling
center for five years. She was a guest lecturer for four
years in a Continuing Legal Education program, teaching Human Resource professionals in a variety of companies. Professor Heminway received pro bono awards
four separate times for her work with and in connection
with political asylum applicants with the Political Asylum/Immigration Representation Project, Inc. Further,
she served as Chair of the Boston Bar Association Corporate Law Committee. She presented at many Boston
Bar Association events, acting as co-facilitator in a
roundtable discussion regarding the materiality of merger
discussions and negotiations, and serving as program
chair and moderator for “Corporate Law 2000: Views
from the Delaware Chancery Court,” the first sectionwide event of the Boston Bar Association Business Law
Section.
Volume 2 Number 1
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After fifteen years of practicing law, Professor
Heminway decided it was time for a change. “As a goaloriented person, I asked myself what else there was to
the practice of law besides the thrill of the next deal,”
she said. She reflected on her work with junior associates and her participation as a mentor in numerous
projects and decided that there was a profession that
would make her happier than private practice. She stated,
“I enjoyed public speaking and my work in various mentor roles. These interests, together with my desire to
pursue more writing, seemed to gel into a teaching position, where I could utilize the same skills that I developed over fifteen years.” Professor Heminway immediately strengthened the transactional curriculum with her
arrival at the University of Tennessee. She currently
teaches Business Associations. This spring, she will teach
Securities Regulation and Corporate Finance. She also
hopes to teach a Mergers and Acquisitions course, as
well as a module of representing enterprises, the
capstone course of the Concentration in Business Transactions.
Professor Heminway desires to convey more than just
legal information to her students. She wants her students to feel confident as lawyers. Her teaching focuses on planning and advising corporate clients because she believes in “not just thinking like a lawyer,
but being a lawyer” in class. In addition, she emphasizes “energy, enthusiasm, and fun” in the classroom so
students can effectively learn the material in a pleasant

‘These interests, together with my
desire to pursue more writing, seemed to
gel into a teaching position, where I
could utilize the same skills that I developed over fifteen years.’
environment. Lastly, Professor Heminway issues various projects and assignments throughout the semester
to help students become better writers.
Professor Heminway said she wants to “bring the kinds
of skills and knowledge that [she] gained outside of the
law school setting into the classroom.” With her experience, interest in mentor roles, and style of teaching, her
decision to come to the University of Tennessee
strengthens a solid transactional department at the school.
She is a welcome addition to the College of Law.

Fall 2000
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tion to the Southeastern Conference of the Association
of American Law Schools entitled Bankruptcy, Federalism,
and the New Common Law.
Professor Don Leatherman’s article Current Developments for Consolidated Groups was published in 15
TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS, DISPOSITIONS, SPINO FFS ,
J OINT
V ENTURES ,
F INANCINGS , R EORGANIZATIONS
AND R ESTRUCTURINGS 2000 389
(Practicing Law Institute 2000), a
multi-volume course handbook series. In October 2000, Professor
Leatherman moderated a panel discussion concerning
current developments for consolidated groups at the
ABA tax section fall meeting; he also prepared the materials presented by the panel, which were distributed at
the meeting. Professor Leatherman also presented a
paper on disregarded entities at the Mid-America Tax
Conference in St. Louis in November, 2000.
Professor Colleen Medill’s article,
Stock Market Volatility and 401(k)
Plans, has been accepted for publication by the MICHIGAN JOURNAL
OF LAW REFORM. Her article, Targeted Pension Reform, will be published as the lead article in the fall
2000 issue of the JOURNAL OF LEGISLATION. She has also been invited
to participate in the Employee Benefit Research Institute Fellows Program. During the summer Prof. Medill spoke on ERISA issues of current
interest at two conferences. She presented Preventive Medicine for Employee Benefit Plans at the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Tennessee Corporate Counsel Association.
At the Annual Meeting of the Southeastern Association
of Law Schools, Professor Medill was a member of the
Tax Policy Panel and spoke on The Budget Process, Pension
Tax Policy Cycles, and Equitable Pension Reform.
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Professor Robert Lloyd taught an
on-line commercial law class in the
summer of 2000. See related article on page 6. The class was
taught entirely by computer, using
interactive tutorials and on-line
chats as the teaching vehicles. This
was the first time such a course
was taught in an accredited law
school. For more about Professor
Lloyd’s on-line class, see the article by David Coenen in
this issue of TRANSACTIONS. Another article about the
class will appear in a forthcoming issue of the JOURNAL
OF LEGAL EDUCATION.
Professor Gregory M. Stein spoke
at the ABA Annual Meeting in New
York on the topic Is There Any Recourse Against Nonrecourse Financing?
The Scope of the Borrower’s Liability
in a Nonrecourse Real Estate Loan. His
article on this topic also appeared
in the course materials that accompanied the discussion. Professor
Stein’s article Who Gets the Takings
Claim? Changes in the Land Use Law, Pre-Enactment Owners,
and Post-Enactment Buyers, was published at 61 OHIO ST.
L. J. 89 (2000).
Professor Carl Pierce has been involved in the following activities:
Speaker, Corporate Counsel and MultiEthics: Multiple Roles, Multiple Lawyers Working in Firms and Teams,
Multi-Jurisdictional Practice, and MultiDisciplinary Practice, 8th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, Tennessee Chapter of the American Corporate Counsel Association and the
Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law of the University of Tennessee College of Law,
( Memphis, TN, May 4, 2000). Panelist, Ethics Issues in the
Representation of a Fiduciary, 26th National Conference on
Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association
Center for Professional Responsibility (New Orleans,
LA, June 1, 2000).
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Faculty Profile: Professor Colleen Medill
By Cherie Light
What do you get when you cross the business concentration with the advocacy concentration? You get
Colleen Medill, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Tennessee College of Law. Professor Medill
graduated from the University of Kansas Law School in
1989. After graduation, she served as a law clerk to the
Honorable Deanell Reece Tacha on the United States
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. Following her clerkship, Professor Medill joined a large law firm in Kansas
City, Missouri. Her practice focused on corporate transactions and litigation matters involving the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). She
left private practice to join the faculty at the University
of Tennessee College of Law in 1997.
Professor Medill chose to embark on her teaching
career at Tennessee for two reasons. First, she was
impressed by the collegiality of the faculty. Second,
she was excited by the College of Law’s business transactions concentration. Based on her experiences in private practice, Professor Medill believed that law schools
generally do not provide students with skills-training
for corporate transactional work. “Students at other law
schools do not receive needed training skills. They learn
how to do research and how to write argumentative briefs,
but they do not learn how to do transactional planning
and transactional drafting.” Professor Medill believes it
is very important for students to know how to strategically plan a transaction and how to implement the plan
in writing.
Professor Medill teaches Property, Gratuitous Transfers, Wealth Transfer Tax, and Employee Benefits Law.
Employee Benefits Law is a new course offering for the
College of Law. The course covers the highly technical
and specialized areas of law relating ERISA, the federal
statute that governs the employer sponsored retirement
and health care plans. Professor Medill approaches the
topic as “what every general corporate lawyer or every
general litigator needs to know about ERISA,” and, by
doing so, the course merges the focus of the business
and advocacy concentrations.
The topics covered in Professor Medill’s Employee
Benefits Law course include taxation of qualified retirement plans, employer disclosure obligations and fiduciary duties, issues arising in corporate transactions, private litigation claims and remedies, and federal preempVolume 2 Number 1

Professor Colleen Medill believes students should
receive solid transactional training while in law
school.
tion of state law. Professor Medill uses her experience
from private practice to formulate problems for the students. Some problems require the students to imagine
themselves as an attorney representing a corporation and
look at the situation from a planning perspective. In
such problems the students must decide the best way to
guide an employer to avoid potential litigation. Other
problems provide a set of facts and ask the students to
develop a litigation strategy from the perspective of either the employer or the employee. Professor Medill
finds that the composition of her employee benefits class
is roughly half business concentration students and half
advocacy concentration students. “The two groups learn
a lot from each other,” states Professor Medill.
When she is not teaching, Professor Medill interacts
with students by serving as the judicial clerkship advisor. She also serves on the Academic Standards and
Curriculum Committee for the College of Law.
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Students Go On-line For
Commercial Law Class
at the College of Law
By David E. Coenen
Students taking Commercial Law at the College of
Law had the option of attending class in their underwear during the 2000 summer session. By pointing and
clicking their way to the Commercial Law chat room via
the Internet, students could stay at home and participate
in discussions about the class material with Professor
Robert Lloyd and the other students without worrying
about what clothes to wear or whether to comb their
hair. This two credit hour Commercial Law class was
the first on-line course for the College of Law, and represents the first time such a course has been offered by
an accredited law school.
“I think it was very successful,” said Professor Lloyd,
who designed the course. “We hope to be able to do it
again in the future.”
Five students enrolled in the course, which focused
on the black letter law instead of case law and covered
secured transactions, commercial paper, and sales. Course
information was posted on the Internet by using the
Blackboard CourseInfo system and sending e-mail messages to the students. A two hour final was held at the
College of Law at the end of the summer session.
Kaye Ford, a second-year law student, said she took
the course because it met her needs for the bar exam.
She said students only had to purchase a statute book
for the on-line course, rather than the usual casebook,
which is required for the four-hour class. “It gave me a
lot of information on secured transactions - a lot of
useful information,” Ford said. “I highly recommend it.
It’s very helpful the way it’s set up.”
The largest segment of the course, secured transactions, was taught with materials distributed by the Center for Computer-Assisted Legal Instruction (CALI). The
primary CALI program used was “Teach Yourself the
UCC” by Professor Lisa Lamkin Broome of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. This program was
supplemented by four shorter exercises: “UCC Article
9: Scope, Attachment, and Perfection,” “UCC Article 9:
Proceeds,” and “UCC Article 9: Default,” and “Understanding Fixtures: Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code,” all authored by Professor Lloyd. The
students purchased CALI compact disks to do the exercises, although they had the option of accessing the maFall 2000
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terials through CALI’s web site or the College of Law’s
computer lab.
“It works really well, especially when you’re teaching
black letter law,” Professor Lloyd said of the interactive
computer exercises. Professor Lloyd, who has twice
won the Donald Trautman Lesson Writing Competition
sponsored by CALI, also developed interactive computer exercises to teach students commercial paper.
The interactive exercises were supplemented by twohour on-line classes using the chat feature of the
CourseInfo system. These classes were held every other
week. During the on-line class, individual students were
called on to post answers to portions of questions, which
were posted a few days prior to the class. Other students were given the opportunity to disagree with the
answer or add to the response. Professor Lloyd would
answer students’ questions during the sessions as well.
The entire chat session, student questions, answers and
Professor Lloyd’s remarks could be downloaded and
printed.
A number of students who were spending the summer in other cities wanted to enroll in the course, but
Professor Lloyd limited the course to students residing
in Knoxville over the summer so that he could hold
physical classes or use the College of Law’s computer
lab in the event of technical difficulties. The class did
not experience any major difficulties, so future on-line
courses may allow enrollment by students who are traveling or clerking in other cities.
The number of students allowed to enroll in future
on-line courses may be increased from the five that were
allowed to enroll in the summer; however, the on-line
chat feature of the classes would become unwieldy if
there were too many students in the course. “It would
work with a larger group, we’d just have to use a different format,” Professor Lloyd explained. Some options
for a larger group include dividing a large class into
sections for on-line chats or using threaded discussion
groups instead of real-time on-line chats.
Overall, the College of Law’s first on-line course
was a success, which could mean more on-line courses
in the future. “Everything worked smoothly,” Professor Lloyd said. “I got a lot of positive feedback.”
Dean Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., said he was very excited
about the on-line class and the opportunities technology brings to the College of Law. “We thought we’d try
commercial law because some of our students want to
take it for the bar or for background but don’t want to
take the four hour course,” he said. “What’s nice is that
Volume 2 Number 1
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it’s interactive and they have to participate in the learning process.”
Dean Galligan posted audio links of some of his
lectures on the CourseInfo system for his Torts II class
in the Spring Semester. Students could listen to Dean
Galligan’s 20-minute lectures on various topics as a
supplement to his torts classes. “My view is that it’s a
question of teaching style. We all know what’s best for
us and for our students,” he explained. Dean Galligan
said he would leave it up to the professors to decide
whether to hold on-line courses at the College of Law.
“As far as legal education across the board, we’ll see
more and more of this,” Dean Galligan explained. “We’ll
see an increase in on-line courses at law schools.”

BOOK REVIEW: Bringing Your Law
Firm into the Digital Age
By Jonathan Hensley
Jerry Lawson, THE INTERNET HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS
(1999). Law Practice Management Section, American
Bar Association. 447 pages. $49.95.
Jerry Lawson’s THE COMPLETE INTERNET HANDBOOK
FOR LAWYERS, should be added to that list of form books,
statute books, case reporters, and legal reference works
that are the essentials of any law firm library. Written
both for Internet newcomers and experienced users,
Lawson’s guide explains the importance of the Internet
as a research tool, marketing aid, and practice area. It
also contains some thoughtful discussion of the implications of the Internet for the practice of law. The
book is useful to any attorney looking to make the most
of the Internet.
Lawson begins with a brief discussion of “Why the
Internet Matters to Lawyers,” and briefly explains some
Internet basics for the uninitiated. He provides an introduction to e-mail, including some potential dangers
lawyers and law firms should recognize when using email.
Lawson then moves to the use of the Internet as a
research tool. Most lawyers are familiar with LEXIS,
Westlaw and other search engines, but even experienced
web users can benefit from Lawson’s tips. He provides
some helpful tips on phrasing search requests and using
search operators to search more efficiently. Lawson
believes that Internet discussion groups, mailing lists,
Volume 2 Number 1
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and newsgroups are overlooked by attorneys. Although
they can be tools for procrastination, they can also mean
efficient research when used properly. Lawson points
out that for many legal questions, “there is probably at
least one person in the world who (a) knows the answer,
and (b) would be glad to tell you the answer at no charge,
as long as there is little or no inconvenience or expense.” These people can often be found on the Internet.
Lawson also discusses the role of the Internet in
marketing, an area of increasing interest to firms of all
sizes and in all practice areas. Lawson believes that law
firm websites can only supplement, not replace, the traditional forms of initiating client contacts. However,
websites are an excellent, and increasingly common, way
of providing information to current and prospective clients. Lawson explains how to plan a website, the benefits a firm can realistically expect, and what to look for
when choosing a web developer to build your site.
Part Four of the HANDBOOK addresses ethics and
security. Lawson reminds us that ethics rules apply on
the Internet just as much as in the “real world.” Lawson
focuses on e-mail privacy, security, and computer viruses in particular. This is one of the book’s most useful sections.
The HANDBOOK turns to more advanced Internet tools
in Part Five. Lawson discusses the uses and benefits of
intranets (computer networks within a single organization that are not open to the public) versus extranets
(computer networks linking single organizations), as well
as interactive websites. Lawson also provides several
useful appendices, covering such topics as web troubleshooting, website design, and an overview of the substantive law of the Internet.
If this book has any flaw, it’s that it covers such a
broad range of topics that it does not always go into as
much detail as one would like. Nevertheless, the book
is highly useful for lawyers who want to maximize the
Internet’s usefulness to their practice, and especially to
those who are just beginning to use the Internet as a
practice aid. It contains more than enough information
to get started, and directs the reader to other resources,
both print and web based, with more information. Finally, and appropriately, for a book on the Internet in
the practice of law, the book is updated with “electronic
pocket parts” found at www.lawyernetbook.com <http:/
/www.lawyernetbook.com>
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If you are intested in submitting an article for
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SYNOPSES
DEBTOR-CREDITOR
Transfers of Marital Property Under a Separation Agreement Are Not Immune From Avoidance, In re Fordu, 201
F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 1999).
By Jennifer Pierson
In the case of In re Fordu, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that a bankruptcy trustee may seek avoidance of certain transfers of marital property by a debtor
to his former wife under a separation agreement determined to be fair, just, and equitable by the state domestic relations court.
After filing a petition to dissolve their marriage, Mr.
and Mrs. Fordu executed a settlement agreement that
conveyed the marital residence and all future rights in
certain lottery proceeds to Mrs. Fordu. In return, Mrs.
Fordu waived any claim to alimony or interest in Mr.
Fordu’s upcoming restaurant venture. The state domestic relations court entered an agreed dissolution decree
that incorporated the separation agreement and found it
to be fair and equitable. Two years after the dissolution
was decreed, Mr. Fordu filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The
trustee for the bankruptcy court sought to avoid the
transfers as fraudulent or preferential transfers under
state law.
The bankruptcy court held that the lottery proceeds
were the separate property of Mrs. Fordu, not marital
property. Therefore, Debtor held no interest in the proceeds that the Trustee could acquire. The court also
held that Trustee was precluded from litigating the issue
of whether the challenged transfers were made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value because the domestic relations court deemed the separation agreement
to be a fair and equitable settlement.
The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) reversed. The
BAP held that Mr. Fordu had an interest in the lottery
proceeds at the time of the transfer because property
acquired during a marriage is marital property. The BAP
also determined that the separation agreement did not
preclude the Trustee from litigating the issue of whether
the challenged transfers were made in exchange for reasonably equivalent value.
On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed and found
that the dissolution decree was consensual. The issues
it addressed had not been actually litigated and were not
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entitled to preclusive effect. Further, the Trustee, for
claim preclusion purposes, was not in privity with the
Debtor, Mr. Fordu. Finally, even if the issue had been
litigated, a determination that the value was fair and just
in a divorce proceeding is not the same as a finding of
reasonably equivalent value in a bankruptcy proceeding.
This case shows that, when property acquired during
marriage is transferred during dissolution proceedings,
those proceedings do not necessarily prevent a bankruptcy trustee of one of the divorcing parties from attempting to avoid and recover the transfers. Attorneys
assisting in the agreed transfer of marital assets should
advise their clients to include details showing reasonably equivalent value on both sides of an exchange.
This may not bar future attempts to void the transfer,
but it may assist in defending the transfer. Attorneys for
potential debtors should warn the clients of the potential that a trustee may scrutinize and challenge any recent property transfers upon filing.

EMPLOYMENT
Assignment of Employment Contracts Does Not Constitute Modification, Managed Health Care Assocs. v. Kethan,
209 F.3d 923 (6th Cir. 2000).
By Kirk Moore
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that an assignment of an employment contract by the employer does not modify the terms of an
employment contract. The assignment, the court stated,
constitutes “a separate agreement between the assignor
and assignee which merely transfers the assignor’s contract rights, leaving them in full force and effect as to
the party changed.”
The main issue before the Sixth Circuit was whether
or not the assignment of Kethan’s employment contract
by MedEcon to Managed Healthcare Associates (MHA)
constituted a modification, and, in turn, a nullification,
of the terms of the contract when the contract provided that “no waiver, alteration, or modification of any
of the provisions of this Agreement shall be valid unless in writing and signed by both of the parties hereto,”
and Kethan did not “sign off,” or agree in writing to the
assignment. Kethan claimed that the assignment of his
employment contract itself would essentially modify its
terms, and that any modification would have to be apVolume 2 Number 1
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proved by him and MHA in writing before they would
become valid, as stated in his employment contract. The
Sixth Circuit, however, reasoned that Kethan’s contractual rights and duties, as an employee, did not change.
The only change occurred with respect to the “entity
now entitled to enforce the terms and conditions that
Kethan had previously agreed to when he entered into
his employment agreement.” The court concluded that
an assignment to MHA would not modify the contract,
and thus, would not require an agreement in writing by
the parties to agree to the assignment. The Sixth Circuit
went on to further state that, “assignments and modifications [of contracts] are completely different concepts,
and that assignability is not impacted by ‘boilerplate’
modification provisions [in the contract].”
As the case illustrates, the mere fact that a business,
corporation, or any other entity, for that matter, is acquired or sold, does not serve as a modification, or legally affect or alter the terms of an existing employee’s
employment contract. It follows that a contract that is
either silent or contains “boilerplate” language as to assignability will be considered valid, unchanged, and fully
enforceable against the employee.

ESTATE PLANNING
Disclaiming After the Transfer, Hull v. Johnson, No.
W1999-02011-COA-R3-CV; 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 856;
1999 WL 1336086 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
By Stephen R. Johnson
Is a partial disclaimer of funds timely filed when the
disclaimer is made after a transfer of those funds? Can a
surviving spouse validly disclaim property she and her
husband held in a bank account as tenants by the entirety after the husband’s death? The Tennessee Court
of Appeals answered both questions in the negative.
Before his death, William T. Hull and his wife Sarah
consulted with an attorney in preparing an estate plan.
Their attorney prepared a plan providing that if Mr. Hull
died first, his last will and testament would leave the
maximum credit shelter amount of $600,000.00 in equal
shares to three daughters by a prior marriage. When Mr.
Hull passed away in August of 1994, Sarah Hull served
as executrix. Since the estate account held insufficient
funds to make the complete $600,000.00 cash bequest to
Mr. Hull’s daughters, Sarah Hull transferred $200,000.00
from an account she had held with her husband as “joint
tenants with right of survivorship” to the estate account
in November of 1994. Almost six months later, in May
Volume 2 Number 1

44
of 1995, Mrs. Hull filed a partial disclaimer renouncing
and refusing to accept any interest in most of the transferred amount.
The Tennessee Department of Revenue challenged the
partial disclaimer. Mrs. Hull paid an assessed gift tax
amount determined by the state and subsequently filed
a complaint for a refund plus any accrued interest. After a bench trial, the chancellor found that Mrs. Hull did
not file an effective partial disclaimer because she transferred the funds prior to the expiration of the period in
which she was permitted to disclaim. Mrs. Hull appealed the chancellor’s decision, raising for review the
issues of (1) whether she filed a timely and effective
partial disclaimer of funds, and (2) whether she could
disclaim funds on deposit in a joint bank account held
with her husband which had a right of survivorship upon
the husband’s death.
Disclaimers are governed by Tenn. Code Ann. § 311-103 (Supp. 1998). The statute states that any “assignment, conveyance, encumbrance, pledge, or transfer of
property or an interest therein or any contract therefor”
made before the end of the nine-month disclaimer period, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-103(b)(2), bars
the right to disclaim the property. Tenn. Code Ann. §
31-1-103(d)(1) (Supp. 1998). The appellate court held
that because Mrs. Hull transferred the $200,000.00 nearly
six months prior to filing the partial disclaimer, she is
barred from any right to disclaim the property under this
statute. This resolved the first issue in favor of the
state.
Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 31-1-103(a) (Supp.
1998), a person may disclaim all or part of their interest
in property if they receive property as a gift from a
decedent’s estate upon the exercise of a power of appointment, as the result of another person’s disclaimer,
under any other type of gratuitous transfer, as a designated beneficiary on a pay-on-death account or similar
deferred compensation agreement, or as a fiduciary holding powers as a fiduciary. The appellate court found
that Mrs. Hull and her husband owned the joint account
as tenants by the entirety. This status did not satisfy any
of the statutory criteria because Mrs. Hull was in possession of the funds from the account’s inception and
did not receive any new or additional interest in the joint
account when her husband died. Thus, she was not a
recipient of property and was not qualified to disclaim,
and the state prevailed on the second issue as well.
The Hull family’s predicament should serve as a warning for estate planners not only to ascertain the value of
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a client’s assets, but also to understand the ownership
nature and use of those holdings. In hindsight, if the
account at issue had been changed to one held solely by
Mr. Hull, and then had that account been devised to
Mrs. Hull in Mr. Hull’s will, then Mrs. Hull could have
effectively filed a disclaimer. Alternatively, instead of
changing the ownership of the account, adequate funds
to cover any expected shortfall in Mr. Hull’s estate could
have been withdrawn from the joint account before his
death and deposited in a separate account, of which he
was the sole owner. An investigation of not only the
value of a client’s assets but also the ownership and
nature of those assets might alert a careful estate planner to any funds shortage while also providing that planner with several alternatives as a solution to this problem.

REAL ESTATE
Doctrine of Merger in Deeds of Conveyance Will Not
Protect Fraud, Continental Land Company, Inc. v. Investment
Properties Company, No. M1998-00431-COA-R3-CV, (Dec.
10, 1999); 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 810; 1999 WL 1129025
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
By Jeremy Cherry
The Court of Appeals of Tennessee held that the
doctrine of merger will not resolve discrepancies between an executory contract for the sale of real property and the subsequent transfer deed where the differences in the deed result from the fraudulent behavior
of one of the parties to the transaction. In a transaction
for the sale of real property, the doctrine of merger
provides that the terms set forth in the deed of conveyance govern the transaction, notwithstanding the existence of a prior executory sales agreement between the
parties. The application of this doctrine was at issue, in
this case, where one of the parties to the transaction
deliberately prepared the deed to convey less property
than was originally promised in the sales contract and
used his superior knowledge and experience to conceal
the discrepancies from the unsuspecting purchaser.
In Continental Land, Mr. Joseph Godochik, a real estate investor and owner of Continental Land Company,
entered into a sales agreement for the purchase of a
sizable tract of land with Investment Properties Company. Mr. Robert Brown, a partner in Investment Properties and a licensed attorney whose practice was almost
exclusively in real estate, drafted the contract to reflect
the parties’ negotiated terms. A few days prior to the
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closing date, agents of both parties met in Mr. Brown’s
office for a pre-closing conference to review the deed
and other documents involved in the sale. Although
Mr. Brown drafted and signed the deed, he did not explain the description contained in the deed or review
the documents with the agents. The agents, who were
not attorneys and were inexperienced at reading deeds,
had trouble following the description and comparing it
to the plat given them by Mr. Brown. Furthermore, Mr.
Brown did not indicate to the agents, who were under
the assumption that the deed conformed to the sales
contract, that some of the provisions in the deed were
inconsistent with the terms of the contract. As a result
of these deliberate changes, which were inconspicuously
placed in the description, the property conveyed in the
transaction was less than was originally promised in the
sales agreement, and the property was substantially less
accessible, making development plans more difficult and
expensive.
The court of appeals concluded that the law in Tennessee is that an executory contract for the purchase of
real estate merges into the deed, which, subsequently,
becomes the final contract governing the transaction,
except in cases of fraud or mutual mistake. The court
found no mutual mistake in light of Mr. Brown’s concession that he intentionally drafted the deed to convey
less property than agreed to in the sales contract and the
fact that he, not his unsuspecting agent, signed the deed.
Therefore, the only issue left before the court was
whether Mr. Brown’s conduct amounted to fraud.
Under Tennessee law, a claim for fraud may involve
an affirmative misrepresentation of material facts, or as
in this case, may arise from the concealment of material
facts. To constitute concealment there must not only be
a failure to disclose known facts, but there must also be
evidence of a trick or contrivance or a legal duty to
disclose. The court found that Mr. Brown failed to
disclose the material fact that the deed did not conform
to the contract and further found that he exploited his
position as the only real estate lawyer in the transaction
to “conceal” the inconsistent provisions in the description of the deed so that lay persons, like the agents,
could not easily find them, thus amounting to a trick or
contrivance.
In addition, fraud by concealment may be found if
one fails to perform a duty to disclose a material fact
and such duty arises: (1) through a fiduciary relationship
between the parties; (2) where a party has expressly reposed trust and confidence in the other; or (3) from an
implied duty of good faith. The court found that Mr.
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Brown undertook the responsibility of preparing the deed
knowing that all parties to the transaction had placed
their expressed “trust” and “confidence” in his expertise as an experienced real estate lawyer. Therefore, by
failing to disclose the discrepancies in the deed, he violated a duty of reasonable care, expected of all attorneys, to communicate any information that would help
guide parties in such a transaction. Furthermore, the
court found that because the inconspicuous changes Mr.
Brown made could not have been discovered by lay
persons through the exercise of ordinary diligence, his
failure to disclose the discrepancies between the deed
and the contract violated the implied duty of good faith.
Consequently, for all of these reasons, the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
As Continental Land illustrates, courts will not allow
even well-accepted legal doctrines to operate in a substantially inequitable nature. In this case, the court emphasized the fact that Mr. Brown deliberately exploited
his position of expertise as the sole real estate attorney
in the transaction to draft the deed so that the discrepancies would be unintelligible to the non-attorney agents.
Consequently, when an attorney is a party to a real estate transaction in which his expertise is relied upon by
inexperienced, non-attorney parties, he or she would be
well advised to disclose fully all relevant facts to the
transaction. The holding in Continental Land, however,
is fact-specific and thus, is unlikely to have any farreaching limiting effects on the doctrine of merger.
_____
Encumbrance vested in Third Party, Minton v. Long, 19
S.W.3d 231 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.D. 1999).
By Ethan Underwood
In Tennessee, where an easement contains a subordination, the foreclosure or sale of a later recorded mortgage terminates any encumbrances on the property, including the prior-recorded easement. In addition, Tennessee now allows grantors of encumbrances to vest
rights in third parties, if they so demonstrate their intent.
In Tennessee, an easement created after an estate is
mortgaged terminates if the estate is sold or the mortgage is foreclosed. However, in Minton, the easement
was made before the servient estate was mortgaged. To
resolve the matter, the Court of Appeals looked to a
factually similar case, Dover Mobile Estates v. Fiber From
Products, Inc., which states that “[a] lease which is subordinate to [a mortgage] is extinguished by the foreclosure
sale.” 270 Cal. Rptr. 183, 185 (1990). “Absent such an
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adjustment, priorities will be governed by the recording
acts and related common law principles.” Id.
The subordinating provision in the original easement
at issue stated that “all parking and access rights granted
shall . . . be subordinate to any existing first mortgage(s)
on either or both properties affected . . . whether such
mortgage(s) now exist or may be hereafter imposed . . .
.” In light of this provision, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that the Parking and Access Easement terminated upon foreclosure of the later
mortgage.
Although the common law rule is that “a reservation
or exception in a deed cannot create rights in strangers
to an instrument,” the Court of Appeals refused to apply the common law rule and determined that “a grantor
may, without words of grant, vest rights in a third party
stranger to [a] deed.” Id. at 239. The court stated that
the rule’s intent to create uniformity in deeds of conveyance no longer served the public interest. Where
the public interest is not served by common law doctrines, Tennessee courts may be willing to abandon them.

TAX
Parent Corporation’s Stock Dividends From Subsidiary
Not Subject to Tennessee’s Excise Tax on Corporate
Business Earnings, Berry v. Huddleston, No. 01A01-9809CH-00487, (Oct. 28, 1999); 1999 Tenn. App. LEXIS 738;
1999 WL 976528 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
By Joseph B. Freedle
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
Tennessee’s excise tax on corporate business earnings
does not apply to stock dividends paid to a parent corporation by a subsidiary engaged in a related business
when the parent held a 20 percent interest in, and shared
directors and officers with, the subsidiary. Tennessee
levies an excise tax on the business earnings of corporations for the privilege of doing business in Tennessee.
When a corporation does business in many different
states and countries, the State of Tennessee may only
tax the business earnings of that corporation that can be
attributed to the business it does within this State. The
Supreme Court allows the States to tax a corporation’s
business earnings based on an apportionable share of
the multi-state business conducted in that State, this is
known as the unitary business principle.
The court identified three alternative tests to determine the existence of a unitary business. The first test
is the “three unities” test, which focuses on the unity of
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ownership, operation (purchasing, advertising, accounting, and management), and centralized executive force.
The second test requires the court to examine the record
for evidence of functional integration, centralization of
management, and economies of scale. The third test,
called the “dependency and contribution” test, examines whether the business components under consideration contribute to each other and the operation as a
whole. Given the facts of the case, the court could not
find that a unitary business existed using any of these
three tests.
In determining whether the dividends were income
from an operational investment, the Court asked two
questions: (1) whether the capital transaction added value
to the interstate business as a whole as well as to the
value of that part of the business in Tennessee; and (2)
whether the realization of that capital bore such a functional or operational relationship to the taxpayer’s business and minimum connection to Tennessee as to make
taxation of that asset constitutionally proper. The court
found Tennessee parent corporation’s stock holdings in
its out of state subsidiaries, in which it now held but a
minority interest, did not relate to its business in Tennessee despite the similarities of their businesses (domestic and foreign yellow page listing sales.) Thus, the
court concluded that the dividends were in no way connected with the State of Tennessee and ordered a refund of the excise tax.
As Berry illustrates, evidence of a unitary business or
operational asset will not result merely from a similarity
in the businesses of a parent and its subsidiary. Berry
does state that in order for dividend payments to be
subject to apportionment for excise tax purposes outside the context of a unitary business, the dividend must
represent an operational asset of the taxpayer by adding
value to the portion of the taxpayer’s business that is
actually carried on in the taxing jurisdiction. Because
the court found neither a unitary business or an operational asset in Berry, it is unclear exactly where a court
will set the bar for taxation in subsequent cases.
_____
Application of Internal Revenue Code § 1341 to Fraudulently Received Funds, Culley v. United States, 222 F.3d
1331 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
By Ryan Stinnett
Under the “claim of right” doctrine, a taxpayer who
“receives income under a claim of right and without
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restriction as to its disposition” must include the amount
as gross income for the year in which it was received. If
the taxpayer later determines that the funds must be
repaid, § 1341 of the Internal Revenue Code allows certain taxpayers to reduce tax liability in the year funds are
repaid by an amount equal to the income tax already
paid in the year when the funds were originally received.
In Culley v. United States, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19981
(Fed. Cir. 2000), the Federal Circuit concluded that a
taxpayer did not receive income under a “claim of right”
when he received the income through fraud. Thus, he
could not take advantage of § 1341 when he repaid the
fraudulently received amount.
The taxpayer had argued that restitution payments he
made in 1991 related to income he had reported and
paid taxes on in 1988, and that § 1341 therefore applied
to allow him a deduction of the restitution payment. As
a result, he asserted that he could reduce the tax he
owed in 1991 by the decrease in tax liability in 1988 that
would have resulted if three million dollars in restitution payments had been excluded from his 1988 income.
He, therefore, demanded a refund in this amount from
the service.
Section 1341 applies to the repayment of an amount
included in gross income in an earlier year if, among
other conditions, it appeared that the taxpayer had an
unrestricted right to the funds in the earlier year. The
taxpayer asserted that it appeared to AT&T and Princeton
that Thrust had an unrestricted right to the funds at
issue because neither party placed any restrictions on
the money paid to Thrust. The Federal Circuit held that
this argument does not fit within a proper § 1341 analysis, because that section is applied by focusing on the
taxpayer, not a third party. Thus, for § 1341 to apply, it
must appear to the taxpayer that he has a legitimate “right”
to the income when received.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the Government’s
argument that when funds were knowingly received
through fraudulent acts, a reasonable taxpayer would
not believe that he had a legitimate, unrestricted claim
on the funds. “A taxpayer’s illicit hope that his intentional wrongdoing will go undetected cannot create the
appearance of an unrestricted right.” Therefore, the
Culley court denied the benefits of § 1341 to the taxpayer.
Culley specifically affirms that a taxpayer may not successfully assert the appearance of a “right” to income
for purposes of § 1341 when that income resulted from
intentionally fraudulent acts by the taxpayer. More genVolume 2 Number 1
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erally for the transactional attorney, Culley demonstrates
the general need to advise clients on the potentially devastating affects of fraudulent dealings with customers
and parties to business transactions even though this
may mean walking a fine line in terms of client relations.
Transactional attorneys should remain aware that taxpayers will not be allowed to reap a benefit of the IRC
if the taxpayer qualifies for the benefit solely by means
of fraud or other illegal activity.
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